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Abstract
During the last years it has become recognized that trust is an essential component in
the design of protocols in distributed systems If for example a Key Distribution Center
KDC is employed to distribute public keys the receiver of such a key has to trust the
KDC that the key is authentic Sometimes a trusted entity may recommend another
entity as being trustworthy which in turn can recommend further entities Obviously
the longer such a trust path grows the smaller the trust towards the nal entity will
be On the other hand the higher the number of trustworthy recommendations about an
entity the more trustworthy this entity will become These observations have led to the
introduction of trust values
When deriving the value of a trust path from the trust values of the individual entities
in a distributed manner one faces the problem that the estimation of each others trust
worthiness is a private matter Up to now this problem has been circumvented by either
ignoring it or by not allowing for the derivation of a trust paths value In this paper we
propose a technique for the derivation of the value of a trust path without exposing the
individual trust values to other entities
Keywords
Distributed systems trust values authentication delegation
  INTRODUCTION
During the last few years many new services for distributed systems were developed
They usually rely on some kind of trust between the entities involved In particular this
is true when an authentication service is required for secure systems
In Proceedings of the Working Conference on Multimedia and Communication Security Graz
Austria pp  Chapman 	 Hall 


  Covered Trust Values in Distributed Systems
Most existing systems require an entity to trust another entity either completely or not
at all That means that an entity cannot express its trust restricted to certain capabilities
or to a certain degree Furthermore there is often a xed hierarchy of trust relationships
Birrell et al 	
 CCITT 	
 Gligor et al 	

 Lampson et al 	

	 If for example
an entity A needs to gain trust into a remote authentication server D it can ask an
already trusted server B to recommend D If B does not trust D it may ask another
server C along the hierarchy for a recommendation of D This can be iterated until the
desired trust relationship is established If the trust relationships are indeed organized as
a hierarchy trust derivations are simple But if in our example A distrusts an entity C on
the shortest path to D it will never gain trust in D since there are no alternative ways
which avoid C in a hierarchy
To overcome these problems Yahalom Klein and Beth 	

 have introduced a more
dierentiated view of trust in distributed systems Several trust classes are dened and
individual trust relationships between entities are considered The xed structure of trust
relationships between the servers is given up and a new trust derivation algorithm is intro
duced A forwarding algorithm under slightly dierent assumptions is given by Yahalom
Klein and Beth 	


Because trust is not only a question of trust or distrust Beth Borcherding and Klein
	

 presented trust values and their derivation in distributed systems Trust is mea
sured between  and 	 and functions for the derivation and combination of trust values
are given A more limited type of trust values is already implemented in PGP Zimmer
mann 	

 In this system an entity can bind shades of trust to public keys of trusted
entities These shades unknown untrusted marginally trusted completely trusted ex
press the trust in the recommendation capabilities of others If an entity receives a previ
ously unknown public key with recommendations of known entities it checks whether the
weighted sum of the trusted entities shades exceeds a certain threshold For example two
marginally trusted entities may be deemed as credible as a completely trusted entity and
it takes two completely trusted entities to judge a public key as valid These weights can
be selected by each entity However when recommending a key an entity cannot express
a level of trust in the keys authenticity since the estimation of trustworthiness of the
previous signers is considered private
In this paper we introduce a technique for the computation of trust values which takes
into account the values of the respective entities on a path without revealing them The
individual trust relationships and the trust derivation algorithm of Yahalom Klein and
Beth 	

 are used This algorithm will be implemented in the SELANE Protocol Beth
	

	 Horster and Knobloch 	

 Bauspiess and Knobloch 	

 and be made readily
available in its proposed release in the Internet
 PRELIMINARIES
In this section we give an overview of the formal representation of trust and trust values
For a more detailed description the reader is referred to Beth Borcherding and Klein
	

 Yahalom Klein and Beth 	


We assume the following underlying model of a distributed system The system consists
of entities which communicate via links Each entity has a unique identier and may have
a secret which can be used for authentication purposes The entities can generate read
Preliminaries 
and modify any message on any link Entities may have some computational power eg
for the encryption and decryption of messages
To model degrees of trust we need the notion of numbers of positivenegative expe
riences We assume that an entity can assign a certain number value to each task it
entrusts to another entity This number can be thought of as the number of ECU Eu
ropean Currency Unit being lost when the task is not fullled Each lost or not lost
entrusted ECU increments the number of negative or positive experiences by one
Since there is no need to trust an entity completely if one expects it only to perform a
limited task trust can be granted in distinguished trust classes eg trust in key genera
tion or trust in keeping secrets
  Direct trust and recommendation trust
For each of the classes of trust there are two types of trust direct trust and recommendation
trust To trust an entity directly means to believe in its capabilities with respect to the
given trust class Recommendation trust expresses the belief in the capability of an entity
to decide whether another entity is reliable in the given trust class and in its honesty
when recommending third entities
Recommendation trust can be granted in a restricted manner Constraints can be im
posed on the properties of the recommending entities further along the path as well as
on the entities which are eventually recommended as being directly trustworthy These
properties can include the very names of entities their domains or the number of enti
ties on the path so far The constraints are used to express distrust towards entities or
towards paths with certain properties Due to the dierent notions of direct trust and
recommendation trust we present their formal representations separately
Direct Trust
P trusts
seq
x
Q value v
A direct trust relationship exists if all experiences with Q with regard to trust class x
which P knows about are positive experiences seq is the sequence of entities who mediated
the experiences
 
the recommendation path excluding P and Q v is a value of the trust
relationship which is an estimation of the probability that Q behaves well when being
trusted It is based on the number of positive experiences with Q which P knows about
Let p be the number of positive experiences The value v
z
of these experiences is com
puted as follows
v
z
p  	 
p
 	
This value is the probability that Q has a reliability of more than  founded on the
information P possesses about Q The reliability is the probability that Q turns out to
be reliable when being entrusted with a single task ie a task of value 	 If there have
been negative experiences there is no trust relationship
The parameter  has to be chosen once for the whole system It determines the thresh
old for the reliability under consideration If one wants the trust value to express the
 
We regard a recommendation as propagation of positive experiences
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probability that an entity is more reliable than 
 one chooses  accordingly Since 
is known within the system each entity can recompute its trust values locally to express
dierent reliability thresholds
Recommendation Trust
P trustsrec
seq
x
Q whenpath S
P
whentarget S
T
value v
A recommendation trust relationship exists if P is willing to accept reports from Q about
experiences with third parties with respect to trust class x This trust is restricted to
experiences with entities in S
T
the target constraint set mediated by entities in S
P
the
path constraint set Again seq is the sequence of entities who mediated the recommen
dation trust v is the value of the trust relationship It represents the portion of oered
experiences that P is willing to accept from Q and is based on the experiences P has had
with the entities recommended by Q
Given numbers of positive and negative experiences p and n respectively with the
recommended entities the recommendation trust value v
r
is computed according to the
following formula
v
r
p n 
 
	 
p n
if p  n
 else
 
Representation of the Constraint Sets
The constraint sets need not be stated explicitly It suces to specify predicates which
decide the membership of an entity to the set in question Such a predicate could be
ischildofx A which would be true if x is a child of A in a given hierarchy and hence
describes implicitly the set of all children of A These predicates have to be decidable to
be useful in this context
The predicates may depend on the trust expressions they are evaluated in If the pred
icate in the example above is changed into ischildofx currententity it denes the
set of children of the trusted entity As can be seen in the next section predicates can be
taken over from initial trust expressions into derived ones with dierent trusted entities
so that the same predicate applies to dierent instances of currententity When used as
path constraint set the given sample predicate would restrict the recommendation path
to a descending path in the given hierarchy A constraint set of this type reects distrust
in paths with certain properties and is not coined to distrust certain entities
   Deriving trust relationships
Here we give the rules of inference The rst rule is concerned with the derivation of
direct trust from recommendation trust and direct trust ie recommendation of direct
trust The second rule describes how new recommendation trust can be derived from
two recommendation trust expressions ie recommendation of recommendation trust
Notational details are described below
Covered trust values 
Rule new direct trust
P trustsrec
seq
 
x
Q whenpath S
P
whentarget S
T
value v
 
 Q trusts
seq

x
R value v

 R 
s
S
T
 X  X 
l
seq

 X 
s
S
P
X 
l
P  seq
 

 P trusts
seq
 
Qseq

x
R value v
 
	 v


Rule new recommendation trust
P trustsrec
seq
 
x
Q whenpath S
P
 
whentarget S
T
 
value v
 
 Q trustsrec
seq

x
R whenpath S
P

whentarget S
T

value v

 X  X 
l
seq

R X 
s
S
P
 
X 
l
P  seq
 

 P trustsrec
seq
 
Qseq

x
R
whenpath S
P
 

 S
P

 whentarget S
T
 

 S
T

 value v
 
 v


The symbol  denotes concatenation of sequences or appending of elements to a sequence
the predicates 
l
and 
s
denote the membership of elements to a sequence or to a set
respectively The function 	 in the derivation of direct trust is dened as
v
 
	 v

 	  	 v


v
 
 
This formula is based on the computation of the direct trust according to formula 	 and
the semantics of the recommendation trust values If v

is based on p positive experiences
the following equation holds v
 
	 v

 	  	  	  
p

v
 
 	  
v
 
p
 Thus the new
value is based on the equivalent of v
 
 p experiences In the next section we will need
the inverse function  dened as
v

 v
 
 	  	 v


 v
 

for v
 
  With this denition the following formula holds
v
 
	 v

 v
 
 v

 
Combination of trust relationships
If there are several derived trust relationships towards an entity with respect to the same
trust class the values of these relationships can be combined to yield a unique value This
combined value is usually higher than each of the values involved in the combination Since
we do not need this technique in our paper the reader is referred to Beth Borcherding
and Klein 	


 COVERED TRUST VALUES
In this section we introduce a technique for the derivation of trust values which does not
reveal the actual values to other entities It shows a certain similarity to the concept of
path constraints Consider a setting with the following trust relationships the trust class
KS stands for keeping secrets
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A trustsrec
x
B whenpath S
P
 
whentarget S
T
 
value v
 
B trustsrec
x
C whenpath S
P

whentarget S
T

value v

B trusts
KS
C value v


C trusts
x
D value v

If entity A wants to nd another entity which is trustworthy with respect to trust class x
with a value of at least v
min
 it sends a message to B of the following form
A B  fAB ts
 


S
P
 


S
T
 
 v
min
 v
 
 xg
K
 
A
fmg
K
 
A
denotes a message signed with the secret key of entity A ts
 
is a timestamp and

S
P
 
and

S
T
 
denote those parts of the constraint sets which express distrust towards path
properties not towards explicit entities see section 	 Distrust towards entities is dealt
with later The value v
min
 v
 
is the minimum trust value B has to have in the nal
entity
y
Thus the value v
 
is not revealed if A keeps v
min
as secret which is in its own
interest
Since the message is fresh and B does not have a direct trust relationship it has to
consider to ask C for a recommendation For C to be suitable for this task it has to
be in the set

S
P
 
 Furthermore B has to believe C to be trustworthy with respect to
not collaborating with A to deduce the trust value v

 ie with respect to keeping the
contents of the following message secret
B  C  fBC ts



S
P
 



S
P



S
T
 



S
T

 v
min
 v
 
 v

 xg
K
 
B
Since C trusts D with respect to class x it compares v

against the value given in the
message If the trust value is higher or equal and D lies within

S
T
 



S
T

 it informs
B about the fact that D is suciently trustworthy for A Since B did not include its
distrusted entities in the target constraint set it now has to check whether it distrusts
D If this is the case it has to continue the search by asking other trusted entities for
recommendations if possible If B does not distrust D it informs A about the successful
search A checks again whether it distrusts C or D and if that is not the case can use
the services of D
For example the server D could be a Key Distribution Center Users of such an au
thentication service are able to authenticate other principals of the system based on their
individual trust relationships without revealing trust values
The technique described above can also be applied for delegation Delegation in dis
tributed systems is a process where an entity the delegator delegates another entity the
delegate to be its proxy The delegator gives its rights or parts of its rights to the delegate
which then acts in the name of the delegator Hence the delegator has to nd an entity
which is capable and trustworthy to act as delegate If the delegator does not know such
an entity in advance and is not willing to trust any entity it can ask for recommendations
for suciently trustworthy entities The minimum degree of trustworthiness required and
the trust classes involved can be selected individually for each task to be delegated
In the previous paragraphs we described how to nd a path to any trustworthy entity
y
Note that the actual trust value of the path is composed of v
 
 v
 
with v
 
denoting the value of the
trust of B in the nal entity and recall that v
 
 v
 
	 v
 

 v
 

Conclusion 
A similar method can be applied if an entity received a message which is signed by some
entities so that the trust path is already given To nd out about the trustworthiness of
the message the receiver starts the protocol as above and includes the path of the signing
entities in the path constraints The entity will get back an answer which says whether it
can accept the message as suciently trustworthy
 Secrecy properties
We are mainly concerned with an entity not learning how much it is trusted by others
To extract a single trust value during the given protocol the two entities before and
after the trusting entity would have to collaborate To avoid such a collaboration is the
responsibility of the entity in between It is the only entity aected by the collaboration
and it chooses the next entity on the path by itself
A collaboration of entities which have more than one entity between them could yield
the product of the trust values of the enclosed entities This is a leakage of information
which has to be accepted if the trustworthiness of path is to be evaluated
As stated above we avoid the exposure of distrust by splitting the constraint sets in
distrust towards individual entities and distrust towards properties of the trust paths We
claim that the latter need not be kept secret since it merely describes a derivation policy
as it is used in traditional hierarchical systems Individual distrust on the other hand is
a private matter and is not propagated during trust derivation
 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that considering trust values a private matter does not
imply the uselessness of these values for the evaluation of trust paths We have proposed
a technique to nd entities which are trustworthy to a given degree with respect to a given
trust class without exposing the individual trust values Our technique is not completely
free of information leakage but we argue that this price is not too high for being able to
use the values
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